Trashing IMSI catchers in mobile networks by Khan, Mohammed & Mitchell, Chris J
Trashing IMSI Catchers in Mobile Networks
Mohammed Shafiul Alam Khan∗
ISG, Royal Holloway, University of London
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK
Mohammed.Khan.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk
Chris J Mitchell
ISG, Royal Holloway, University of London
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK
me@chrismitchell.net
ABSTRACT
We address the decades-old privacy problem of disclosure of
the permanent subscriber identity (IMSI), a problem that
arises in all generations of mobile networks and that makes
IMSI catchers a real threat. A number of possible modifi-
cations to existing protocols have been proposed to address
the problem; however, most require significant changes to
existing deployed infrastructures. We propose a novel au-
thentication approach for 3G and 4G systems that does not
affect intermediate entities, notably the serving network and
mobile equipment. It prevents disclosure of the subscriber’s
IMSI by using a dynamic pseudo-IMSI that is only identifi-
able by the home network for the USIM. A major challenge
in using dynamic pseudo-IMSIs is possible loss of identity
synchronisation between USIM and home network, an issue
that has not been adequately addressed in previous work.
We present an approach for identity recovery to be used in
the event of pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation. The scheme
requires changes to the home network and the USIM, but
not to the serving network, mobile phone or other internal
network protocols, enabling simple, transparent and evolu-
tionary migration. We provide a detailed analysis of the
scheme, and verify its correctness and security properties
using ProVerif.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The possibility of user tracking by intercepting air inter-
face traffic was considered in the design phase of 2G GSM,
and was addressed by use of a changing pseudonym, the
temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI), instead of the
permanent international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI).
Newly allocated TMSIs are transmitted in encrypted form
to prevent linking of TMSIs or of a TMSI to the IMSI. The
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same mechanism was adopted in 3G [50] and 4G [25] systems.
Although the temporary identity is used instead of the IMSI
in most cases, in some situations the IMSI is sent in cleartext
by the mobile. One such case is when a mobile is switched
on and wishes to connect to a new network, and so will not
have an assigned TMSI. Another is where the network is
unable to identify the IMSI from the presented TMSI [11]; an
active adversary can exploit this feature and masquerade as
a legitimate network to request the IMSI. Such an adversary
is known as an IMSI catcher [44], and such attacks have been
observed in several countries [28, 43, 48]. In GSM networks,
man-in-the-middle attacks are also possible, [37], although
we do not consider such attacks further here. The discussion
below applies to both 3G and 4G systems, although we use
4G terminology throughout.
A wide range of solutions to the IMSI catcher problem have
been proposed [16, 17, 21, 26, 33, 40, 41]; unfortunately, they
all require significant changes to deployed network infrastruc-
tures, making them impractical. However, van den Broek et
al. [51] and Khan and Mitchell [31] recently described possi-
ble system enhancements which reduce the privacy impact
of IMSI catchers without requiring any changes to serving
networks or mobile phones. We refer below to the respec-
tive schemes as BVR and KM. In both cases, changeable
(temporary) IMSIs are used to help protect privacy; however,
as described below, this also makes possible a potentially
disastrous loss of synchronisation between USIM and home
network, an issue addressed by the scheme described in this
paper.
Both BVR and KM involve updating the IMSI held by
the home network as soon as use of the new IMSI by the
mobile is observed, so a failed serving network could cause
the home network to update its database prematurely by
falsely claiming to have seen use of a new IMSI. This could
cause loss of identity synchronisation between USIM and
home network. In both schemes it is implicitly assumed that
serving networks always behave honestly and that communi-
cations between networks is secure. However, several recent
papers [18, 22, 24, 27, 36, 38, 39, 49] have reported security
flaws in the core network protocols and their implementa-
tion, which makes this assumption questionable; thus loss of
identity synchronisation is possible for both schemes. This
observation motivates the work described here. In summary,
the contributions of the paper are as follows.
• We propose a new authentication approach using
dynamic pseudonyms that does not affect the serving
networks and the mobile equipment.
• We present an approach for identity recovery for use
in the event of identity desynchronisation.
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• We provide a detailed analysis of the scheme, and
verify its correctness and security properties using
ProVerif.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 key terminology for, and features of, mobile telephony
systems are introduced. The BVR and KM schemes are
introduced in Section 3. The proposed new authentication
scheme is described in detail in Section 4, and Section 5 gives
a novel approach for identity recovery. Section 6 provides
analyses, and Section 7 reports on a formal verification of
the scheme. Section 8 provides a summary of other related
work, and conclusions are drawn in Section 9.
2 MOBILE TELEPHONY SYSTEMS
2.1 Terminology
A complete mobile phone is referred to as a user equipment
(UE), where the term covers both the mobile equipment
(ME), i.e. the phone, and the universal subscriber identity
module (USIM) within it, where the USIM takes the form of
a cut-down smart card. The USIM embodies the relationship
between the human user and the issuing home network, where
this relationship includes the IMSI, the telephone number of
the UE, and other user (subscriber) data, together with a
secret key K which forms the basis for all the air interface
security features. Within the USIM, information is stored
in hierarchically structured files, known as elementary files
(EFs), dedicated files and application dedicated files. The
USIM data storage capabilities are specified in Section 10.1
of 3GPP TS 21 111 [5].
To attach to a mobile network, a UE connects via its radio
interface to a radio tower, linked to the core network mobility
management entity (MME). The MME is responsible for
authenticating and tracking the location of UEs, paging, and
interfacing with the home subscriber server (HSS), e.g. to
obtain authentication data and update location data. The
HSS resembles the home location register (HLR) of 3G sys-
tems, and stores mobility and service data for subscribers. It
contains the authentication centre (AuC), which stores the
unique secret key K for each USIM. The MME is part of the
serving network (SN), whereas the HSS is the home network
(HN) component.
2.2 Identities
IMSI: An IMSI is a string of 15 decimal digits, of which the
first three are the mobile country code (MCC), and the next
two or three form the mobile network code (MNC) that identi-
fies the network operator. The MNC length, i.e. whether it is
two or three digits, is a national matter. The remaining nine
or ten digits, known as the mobile subscriber identification
number (MSIN), are administered by the operator in line
with national policy [6, 47]. IMSIs thus have geographical sig-
nificance, and are typically managed by the network operator
in blocks. The MCC/MNC combination uniquely identifies
the HN, and is known as the public land mobile network iden-
tity (PLMN-ID). The MSIN is used by the network operator
to identify the subscriber for billing and other operational
purposes. Each IMSI uniquely identifies the mobile and the
HN. The IMSI is stored in the USIM and is normally fixed.
An IMSI is represented in binary coded decimal, and is stored
in the elementary file EFIMSI [9].
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI):
An IMEI is a string of 15 decimal digits used to uniquely
identify an ME, allowing stolen equipment to be blacklisted.
Since it is permanent, if sent in cleartext it could compromise
user privacy. However, the 4G standards prohibit a UE
from transmitting an IMEI until after a security context
has been activated [25]; as a result, if equipment behaves in
accordance with the standards, the IMEI should not pose a
privacy threat, and so we do not discuss it further here.
Temporary Identities: To enhance user privacy, both
3G and 4G networks employ temporary subscriber identi-
ties, namely the TMSI (3G) and the GUTI (4G), avoiding
the need to send the IMSI across the air interface. When
a subscriber moves from one location area to another, its
temporary identity is updated by the SN. A location area
is a geographical sub-division of a network coverage area;
depending on the service, similar sub-divisions are known as
routing areas and tracking areas. Although a subscriber is
temporarily traceable via its temporary identity, the length of
time a single temporary identity remains valid is configurable
by the SN.
2.3 Authentication
Authentication in 3G and 4G systems is performed using
the authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol. In
AKA, the HN’s AuC generates authentication vectors (AVs)
containing the required data to perform authentication, and
sends them to the SN. More specifically, an AV contains a
random ‘challenge’ RAND, an expected response XRES, an
authentication token AUTN, and a master session key KASME .
AKA starts with the SN sending a user authentication request
to the UE. The UE checks the validity of this request, and
then sends a user authentication response. The SN checks
this response to authenticate the UE. This enables the UE
and network to authenticate each other and simultaneously
establish a shared secret session key.
To participate in AKA, the USIM has a long term secret
key K, known only to the USIM and the USIM’s HN, and a
sequence number SQN, maintained by both USIM and HN.
The key K never leaves the USIM, and the values of K and
SQN are protected by the USIM’s physical security features.
The 48-bit SQN enables the UE to verify the ‘freshness’ of the
user authentication request. More specifically, the request
message contains two 128-bit values: RAND and AUTN,
where RAND is a random number generated by the HN, and
AUTN consists of the concatenation of: SQN⊕AK (48 bits),
AMF (16 bits), and MAC (64 bits), where ⊕ denotes bitwise
exclusive-or. The MAC is a message authentication code
computed as a function of RAND, SQN, AMF, and the long
term secret key K, using a MAC algorithm known as f1. The
value AK is computed as a function of K and RAND, using
a cipher mask generating function known as f5. The AK
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functions as a means of encrypting SQN ; this is necessary
since, if sent in cleartext, the SQN value would potentially
compromise user identity confidentiality, given that the value
of SQN is USIM-specific.
On receipt of these two values, the USIM uses the received
RAND, along with its stored value of K, to regenerate the
value of AK, which it can then use to recover SQN . It next
uses its stored key K, together with the received values of
RAND, SQN, and AMF, in function f1 to regenerate XMAC ;
if the newly computed value agrees with the MAC value
received in AUTN then the first stage of authentication has
succeeded. The USIM next checks that SQN is a ‘new’ value;
if so it updates its stored SQN value and the network has
been authenticated. If authentication succeeds, the USIM
computes another message authentication code, called RES,
and sends it to the network as part of the user authentication
response. If this RES agrees with the value expected by the
SN (XRES in the AV) then the UE is deemed authenticated
by the SN.
AKA relies on a set of cryptographic functions known as
f1–f5, f1∗, and f5∗. Although implementation of these
functions is operator-specific and not fully standardized, the
3GPP documents [13, 14] give an example set of algorithms
for these functions. In this paper we assume that the network
operators use functions with similar characteristics to those
proposed by 3GPP [13, 14].
Error Reporting: The AKA protocol could fail for a
variety of reasons, as discussed in 3GPP TS 24.008 [8]. In
this paper we are interested in the failures involving the
authentication challenge: a MAC-failure arises if the MAC
sent by the network does not match the value the USIM
computes, and a sync-failure occurs if the SQN value sent
by the network is not greater than the USIM’s stored value.
A MAC-failure is reported via a signalling message, whereas
a sync-failure is communicated via a token known as AUTS.
An AUTS is constructed by concatenating a masked version
of the USIM’s SQN and a MAC computed by the USIM,
known as MAC-S. The USIM computes MAC-S using the
function f1∗ with inputs: the received RAND, its stored
key K, its own SQN, and a dummy value of AMF [11]. To
conceal SQN, the USIM masks it with AK, computed using
a variant of f5 known as f5∗.
2.4 Location Update
A UE can initiate a location update procedure for a range
of reasons, including: routing area update, tracking area up-
date, and routing/tracking area update with IMSI attach [7].
On receiving a location update request, the SN runs AKA,
enables the security context, and sends a new temporary
identity to the UE; it then initiates a location update with
the subscriber’s HN (see 3GPP TS 23.012 [2] and 3GPP TS
23.401 [7]).
3 THE BVR AND KM SCHEMES
We next introduce the operation of the BVR and KM schemes
(see Section 1), which relate to the scheme we propose in
this paper. We also discuss the desynchronisation problem
present in both schemes, which motivates the design of the
scheme described in the remainder of this paper.
3.1 The BVR Scheme
In BVR [51], the subscriber’s IMSI is replaced with a changing
pseudonym called the pseudo mobile subscriber identifier
(PMSI), which is only resolvable by the USIM’s HN. The
structure of a PMSI is the same as that of an IMSI, and it
is treated like an IMSI by the SN which is unaware of the
fact it is not an IMSI. The scheme requires the AuC to store
three additional values for each USIM: a new shared secret
key ke, the current PMSI in use by the subscriber, and a
future PMSI. When requested by an SN for an AV for a
particular PMSI, the AuC executes the following steps.
(1) It compares the PMSI with all current and future
PMSIs, and continues if it finds a match.
(2) If the match is with a future PMSI, the AuC updates
the subscriber’s current PMSI to equal the received
PMSI, and assigns a randomly chosen PMSI from
the pool of free PMSIs to be the subscriber’s future
PMSI. If the match is with a current PMSI then the
AuC database is unchanged.
(3) The AuC computes the RAND by AES-encrypting
the concatenation of the 34-bit binary-coded MSIN
part of the future PMSI and the subscriber’s current
SQN, using the key ke.
(4) The AuC computes the other authentication parame-
ters in the AV as a function of the computed RAND
(in the standard way), and transmits the AV to the
SN.
The USIM must possess ke, along with the current and
future PMSIs. On receiving RAND and AUTN, the USIM
executes the usual AKA steps; if AKA is successful, the USIM
decrypts the received RAND and compares the recovered
SQN value with the received SQN . If they agree, the USIM
extracts the binary-encoded MSIN, converts it to binary
coded decimal, and uses it to compute the new future PMSI.
The USIM continues for the moment to use its current PMSI.
When the USIM next receives an identity request, it sets its
stored current PMSI to the stored future PMSI, and responds
with this new value. That is, an updated PMSI is only used
on the next occasion that the USIM receives an identity
request, preventing linking of new and old PMSI values by
observers. However, how the ME will be made aware of the
new PMSI is not discussed in [51].
3.2 The KM Scheme
Analogously to BVR, KM [31] makes use of multiple IMSIs
for an individual USIM. The scheme requires the AuC to
store an IMSI-change flag for each subscriber indicating
whether an IMSI change is required, and up to two IMSIs:
IMSIallocated and IMSIintransit . The event that triggers setting
of the IMSI-change flag is a policy matter for the network.
When requested by an SN for an AV for a particular IMSI,
the AuC executes the following steps.
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(1) It compares the IMSI with all IMSIallocated and IMSIin
transit values, and continues if it finds a match.
(2) If the match is with an IMSIintransit , the AuC adds
the subscriber’s current IMSIallocated to the pool of
unused IMSIs, sets IMSIallocated to the received IMSI,
and clears the subscriber’s IMSIintransit value.
(3) It checks the IMSI-change flag, and computes an AV
in the standard way if the flag is cleared; otherwise
it computes an AV as follows.
(a) The AuC computes a 64-bit MAC as a function
of the subscriber’s SQN and the shared secret
key K, using a variant of the existing f1 func-
tion, the presence of which is used to instruct
the USIM to make an IMSI change (see below).
(b) The AuC generates a 48-bit mask key EK as a
function of the subscriber’s SQN and K, using
a variant of the existing f5 function.
(c) If the subscriber’s IMSIintransit is null, the AuC
assigns a free IMSI to it.
(d) The AuC XORs the MSIN part of the sub-
scriber’s IMSIintransit (binary coded decimal)
with EK, and computes RAND by concatenat-
ing the MAC, the masked MSIN, and a 16-bit
random number.
(e) The AuC computes the other authentication
parameters in the AV in the standard way.
The USIM must temporarily store the value of the last
received IMSI. On receipt of an authentication request, the
USIM uses the standard AKA procedure. After successfully
completing AKA, the USIM computes MAC as a function of
the received SQN, and compares it with the appropriate part
of RAND . If they match, the USIM regenerates EK and
XORs it with the masked MSIN extracted from RAND . The
USIM then constructs the new IMSI by prefixing the retrieved
cleartext MSIN with the PLMN-ID. If the constructed IMSI
is different to its current stored value, the USIM updates
both the stored value and the elementary file EFIMSI , which
contains the IMSI. The USIM then uses the proactive UICC
feature [10] to instruct the ME to read this file, causing it to
start using the new IMSI.
3.3 Practical Issues with BVR and KM
Unfortunately, both schemes are susceptible to possible iden-
tity desynchronisation, i.e. where the USIM and its HN hold
different IMSI values. An active adversary capable of present-
ing an IMSI of its choice to the HN could cause the HN to
incorrectly update its database if the presented IMSI is equal
to a stored future PMSI (for BVR) or a stored IMSIintransit
(for KM). If the corresponding USIM has not received the
new IMSI (or PMSI), this could cause a permanent denial of
service, since there will be no way for synchronisation to be
regained.
Desynchronisation could arise in a variety of ways. One
possible scenario involves a compromised SN sending ran-
domly chosen IMSIs to an HN, e.g. embedded in an AV
request. If a received IMSI is equal to a currently free IMSI,
the HN will respond with an error in the standard way. If
the IMSI is equal to a current IMSI (a current PMSI for
BVR, or an IMSIallocated for KM), the HN will provide an
AV. Finally, and most importantly here, if the IMSI is equal
to a future IMSI (a future PMSI for BVR, or an IMSIintransit
for KM), then there will be a loss of IMSI synchronisation if
the mobile to which the future IMSI belongs has not received
it, and this could cause a permanent denial of service.
A related but distinct scenario involves a malicious or
malfunctioning ME submitting random IMSIs to an SN. The
SN will use a received IMSI to request an AV from the HN
indicated by the PLMN-ID part of the IMSI. The remainder
of the attack will work exactly as in the scenario described in
the previous paragraph; that is, if the random IMSI happens
to equal a stored future IMSI for a USIM which has not
yet received this IMSI, then the corresponding USIM will
suffer from a catastrophic identity desynchronisation. Hence
any such changeable IMSI scheme needs to incorporate an
identity recovery mechanism.
Also, both BVR and KM involve changing the IMSI at the
HN. This introduces major management concerns because
the IMSI is the only permanent unique identifier in the HN,
and other services depend on fixed IMSIs. Thus, a scheme
supporting pseudonyms without changing the IMSIs in the
HN would be highly advantageous.
4 PRIVACY ENHANCED AKA
We now describe a new set of modifications to the operation
of 3G and 4G systems designed to address the same privacy
concerns as the BVR and KM schemes, and using very similar
ideas. However, it incorporates significant additional features
that protect against permanent loss of identity synchronisa-
tion between a USIM and its HN. The scheme also avoids
changing the IMSI in the HN, i.e. it addresses both the major
concerns raised in Section 3.3.
4.1 Overview
Just like BVR and KM, the scheme uses changing pseudonyms.
The scheme avoids sending the subscriber MSIN across any
communication channels, including the radio path and the
core network, and instead uses a transient identity (TID),
i.e. a temporary identity managed by the HN with the same
length as an MSIN. The TID works rather like the TMSI
except that TIDs are managed by the HN instead of the
SN. The TID provides subscriber pseudonymity on the air
interface, avoiding the need for cleartext transmission of the
IMSI. TIDs are mapped to fixed MSINs in the HN database,
and the IMSI is only accessible by the HN.
The initial pseudo-IMSI, equal to the concatenation of the
PLMN-ID and the initial TID, must be stored in a USIM
during personalisation. The pseudo-IMSI is indistinguishable
from an IMSI to any party other than the USIM and HN.
As in BVR and KM, the pseudo-IMSI is treated as an IMSI
by the SN, and is periodically refreshed by the HN. An
unauthenticated UE (without a valid TMSI/GUTI) identifies
itself to the SN using the pseudo-IMSI, exactly as an IMSI
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is used currently. The SN learns the identity of the HN from
the pseudo-IMSI, and forwards it to the HN as part of an AV
request. The HN uses the TID from the pseudo-IMSI to learn
the IMSI. It then chooses a new TID to refresh the pseudo-
IMSI, embeds this new TID into the RAND analogously to
BVR and KM, and computes the AV, which is sent to the
SN for use in AKA.
After a successful AKA, the USIM has the new TID, and
uses it to construct the next pseudo-IMSI. At the same time
the SN allocates the UE a local TMSI or GUTI. As in BVR
and KM, the old pseudo-IMSI remains in use by the current
SN, e.g. in mobile terminated services. The new pseudo-IMSI
is used in subsequent AKA executions. We also introduce
the notion of a recovery identity (RID) for each USIM, to
enable pseudo-IMSI recovery in a privacy-preserving way.
4.2 Modifications to AKA
The pseudo-IMSI is indistinguishable from an IMSI to the
SN, and is used in exactly the same way, i.e. when polled for
its IMSI the phone will respond with its pseudo-IMSI. The
operation of AKA is also unchanged; the only difference is
in the composition of RAND, as discussed in Sections 4.3
and 4.4, and this difference is transparent to the SN.
The only other change of relevance here is to error handling.
As noted in Section 2.3, if a USIM fails to authenticate a
network, it responds with either a MAC-failure message, or a
sync-failure message. As part of the novel scheme (discussed
in detail in Section 4.4.2) if the authentication fails due to a
MAC mismatch, the USIM incorporates a novel failure type
indication in an error token that is sent to the SN (and hence
to the HN) just like a sync-failure error. Since the SN does
not process the error token, the incorporation of a new type
of error code is transparent to it.
That is, the only change from the SN perspective is that it
will never see a MAC-failure message; a malicious third party
could use this to distinguish between an IMSI and a pseudo-
IMSI by sending a modified (and hence incorrect) MAC value
to a UE and seeing what error message is returned.
4.3 Modifications to Home Network
4.3.1 Fundamentals. We first introduce certain data struc-
tures which form part of the modified scheme.
• TID : A TID substitutes for the MSIN, and so its
maximum length is 40 bits (i.e. ten binary coded dec-
imal digits). If the HN implementation encodes the
HSS/HLR identity in the MSIN, as is done in some
networks, the bit-length of a TID could equal the
number of bits used to uniquely identify a subscriber
of that specific HSS/HLR.
• RID : Like the TID, a RID is a 48-bit USIM identifier,
used only in the pseudo-IMSI recovery procedure
described in Section 5.
• Linked-TID : This is a specific TID, sent with a RID
to a subscriber. This TID (if not null) is equal to
the value of the HN stored TIDfuture (see below).
• RID Flag : This bit, maintained for every subscriber
in the HN database, indicates whether or not a RID
value should be embedded into the next RAND for
a subscriber. Initially the flag is cleared. The use of
the flag is similar to that of the IMSI-change flag in
KM.
• Keystream 1 (EK1 ): Like EK in the KM scheme,
the 48-bit EK1 is derived from subscriber-specific
secrets using a key derivation function (KDF). It is
used to mask the TID when sent from the HN to a
USIM.
• Keystream 2 (EK2 ): This is another 48-bit string
generated using a different KDF from subscriber-
specific secrets. It is used to mask the RID when it
is transferred from the HN to a USIM.
• Padding data: Pad1 and Pad2 (each of 80 bits) are
used to extend the subscriber’s SQN value to a 128-
bit string, as required for input to the f5 variant
functions.
• Instruction byte: This is used to instruct a USIM to
perform certain operations. We use specific values of
the byte (INSregular , INSRID and INSreset ) to instruct
the USIM to perform certain tasks. All other values
are reserved for future use — on receipt of a reserved
value the USIM should not take any action.
For each subscriber account in the database, the HN must
maintain a RID flag indicating whether a RID change is under
way. The database must also hold up to three TIDs (TIDpast ,
TIDcurrent and TIDfuture), three RIDs (RIDpast , RIDcurrent
and RIDfuture) and a linked-TID for each subscriber. It will
always hold a TIDcurrent and a RIDcurrent . When a new TID
is transferred to the USIM, the database will hold a TIDfuture ;
on a TID update, described in Section 4.3.3, it will hold a
TIDpast . If the RID flag is set, the database will also hold a
linked-TID and a RIDfuture . Analogously to the TID, on a
RID update, the database will hold a RIDpast . The HN must
also maintain a pool of unused TIDs and RIDs, enabling
the AuC to dynamically assign a new TID and RID to an
existing subscriber.
The following functions are used in the scheme described
below.
• f5∗∗: This KDF is a variant of the existing f5. It
takes as input a 128-bit string and the shared secret
key K, and generates EK1 . The function must be
chosen so that it is computationally infeasible to
derive the key K from knowledge of the string and
EK1 , the requirements of f5 as described in [12].
• f5∗∗∗: This function, used to generate EK2 , must
have similar properties to f5∗∗, but for cryptographic
cleanliness we use a distinct function.
• Randgen: This function takes as input an integer,
and returns a pseudo-random number of the length
specified.
4.3.2 AV Generation. On receiving a request for an AV
for a pseudo-IMSI, the AuC first retrieves the TID from
the pseudo-IMSI and searches its subscriber database for
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Figure 1: Computation of an AV
the corresponding IMSI. If the IMSI is not found, the AuC
generates an arbitrary AV in which all the values are chosen
at random (to initiate pseudo-IMSI recovery by the receiving
USIM, as described in Section 5), and sends it to the SN.
Otherwise, the AuC retrieves the IMSI and proceeds as
follows (see Figure 1).
(1) It retrieves the shared key K, SQN, RID flag, and
stored value of TIDfuture for this IMSI.
(2) It sets EK1 to equal f5
∗∗(SQN ||Pad1 ,K).
(3) If the value of TIDfuture is null, the AuC sets it to
equal a fresh TID selected from the pool of unused
TIDs. The AuC also removes the allocated TID from
the unused TID pool.
(4) If the RID flag is not set, the AuC sets masked-
TID to (TIDfuture ||INSregular )⊕EK1 , and sets RAND
to equal masked-TID||randgen(80). Otherwise, the
AuC computes RAND as follows.
(a) It sets EK2 to equal f5
∗∗∗(SQN ||Pad2 ,K ), and
linked-TID to equal TIDfuture .
(b) If the value of RIDfuture is null, the AuC sets it
to equal a fresh RID selected from the pool of
unused RIDs. The AuC also removes the RID
from the pool of unused RIDs.
(c) It sets masked-TID to (TIDfuture ||INSRID) ⊕
EK1 , and masked-RID to RIDfuture ⊕ EK2 .
(d) It sets RAND to equal
masked-TID||masked-RID||randgen(32).
(5) The AuC generates the AV using the computed
RAND in the standard way.
4.3.3 Identity Update. Although an HN keeps the sub-
scriber’s security credentials to itself, it delegates authentica-
tion to an SN by passing it an AV; thus the HN is not aware
when a specific AV is used in AKA. Thus the HN does not
have a direct means of knowing when a USIM receives a new
TID. As discussed in Section 2.4, a location update request
from an SN is preceded by a successful AKA; we therefore
use the receipt by an HN of a location update request as
implicit indication that a USIM has received the TID in the
provided pseudo-IMSI; we use this to trigger a TID update.
This approach differs from BVR and KM, and to some extent
restricts1 unauthorised updates to the HN database.
When an HSS receives a location update request, it sends
the embedded pseudo-IMSI to the AuC, which may trigger
an identity update. (In 3G, the location update request
is sent to the HLR and not the AuC although, since they
are controlled by the same network, adding the necessary
intercommunication should not be difficult.)
On receiving the pseudo-IMSI, the AuC first retrieves the
embedded TID, and searches its subscriber database for the
corresponding IMSI. If the retrieved TID is not found (as
might occur with a maliciously generated location update
request), the AuC takes no further action; otherwise, the
AuC retrieves the IMSI and compares the embedded TID
with the value of TIDfuture for this IMSI. If they do not agree
(including if the TID matches either TIDpast or TIDcurrent
for this IMSI), the AuC takes no further action; otherwise,
the AuC performs the following steps.
(1) It deletes the value of TIDpast for the retrieved IMSI,
and adds the value of TIDpast to the pool of unused
TIDs.
(2) It sets TIDpast to equal TIDcurrent , TIDcurrent to
equal TIDfuture , and sets TIDfuture to null.
(3) It checks the RID flag. If the flag is clear, the AuC
takes no further action. Otherwise, it retrieves the
value of Linked-TID for the IMSI, and compares
this value with the TID retrieved from the pseudo-
IMSI. If they do not agree, the AuC takes no further
action; otherwise, it updates the RID information in
its subscriber database as follows.
(a) It deletes the value of RIDpast for the retrieved
IMSI, and adds this to the unused RID pool.
(b) It sets RIDpast to equal RIDcurrent , and RIDcurrent
to equal RIDfuture .
(c) It sets RIDfuture , RID flag, and Linked-TID to
null.
4.3.4 RID Flag Setting. The RID flag is used to indicate
to the AuC that the RID should be updated at the next
opportunity. The flag is cleared initially, and it is also cleared
during identity update (when the RID is changed); however,
we do not specify when it is set, since this is a matter for
network policy. A possible trigger for setting the flag would
be if the network believes the RID may have been disclosed,
e.g. if a MAC-failure token is received.
4.4 Modifications to USIM
To support the scheme, a USIM will need to store certain
additional information. We propose that the pseudo-IMSI is
stored in the existing file EFIMSI , and that the RID is stored
in a new EF. We further suppose that the initial RID value
is set during USIM personalisation.
1A maliciously modified ME cannot falsely claim to possess a TID
which it has not been allocated, as discussed in Section 3.3.
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Figure 2: Modified processes in USIM
4.4.1 New Identity Retrieval. On receipt of an authentica-
tion challenge, the USIM proceeds using the standard AKA
procedure. After successful completion of AKA, the USIM
processes the RAND to retrieve the new identities as follows
(see Figure 2(a)).
(1) It sets EK1 to equal f5
∗∗(SQN ||Pad1 ,K ).
(2) It retrieves masked-TID from RAND, and parses
masked-TID⊕EK1 to obtain the TID and instruction
byte.
(3) It compares the retrieved instruction byte with the
three predefined values INSregular , INSRID and INSreset .
If it equals any of these values then the USIM con-
catenates the received TID with the PLMN-ID to
obtain the new pseudo-IMSI, and compares the con-
catenated value with the stored pseudo-IMSI (an
essential step since the same TID may be received
multiple times). If they are the same, the USIM takes
no further action; otherwise, it keeps a record of the
new pseudo-IMSI and later updates its pseudo-IMSI
using the procedure described in Section 4.4.3.
(a) If the received instruction byte equals INSRID ,
then the USIM also performs the following steps.
(i) It sets EK2 to equal f5
∗∗∗(SQN ||Pad2 ,K ).
It retrieves masked-RID from RAND, and
parses masked-RID⊕EK2 to obtain a RID.
(ii) It compares the retrieved RID with the
stored RID (an essential step since the
same RID may be received multiple times).
If they are the same the USIM takes no
further action; otherwise it updates its
stored RID.
(b) If the received instruction byte equals INSreset ,
then the USIM immediately updates its pseudo-
IMSI with the received pseudo-IMSI, using the
procedure described in Section 4.4.3. This case
will arise when an HN wishes to synchronise the
pseudo-IMSI between the USIM and the HN,
as described in Section 5.
4.4.2 Failure Token Generation. As mentioned in Section 4.2,
we introduce a novel error token, the AUTM, to enable a
USIM to report a MAC-failure arising during authentication.
To construct AUTM, the USIM computes a 64-bit MAC,
the MAC-M, as a function of its stored RID, the current
pseudo-IMSI, the key K, and a dummy AMF, using the
existing f1∗ function (see Figure 2(b)), and sets AUTM to
(RID ||MAC −M ). The structure of AUTM is similar to
that of the sync-failure token AUTS, discussed in Section 2.3.
When a USIM detects a MAC-failure in authentication, it
computes AUTM, and reports it to the SN in the same way
as an AUTS .
4.4.3 New Pseudo-IMSI Notification. The scheme requires
a way to transfer a new pseudo-IMSI from the USIM to the
ME for subsequent use. As in KM [31], we propose using the
USIM application toolkit feature [10] to instruct the ME to
read the new pseudo-IMSI and thereby start using the new
value.
5 PSEUDO-IMSI RECOVERY
5.1 A Desynchronisation Scenario
Unfortunately, the authentication scheme described here is
not completely free from possible pseudo-IMSI desynchroni-
sation. However, it allows pseudo-IMSI synchronisation to
be regained as soon as its loss is detected. Analogous to the
discussion in Section 3.3, one possible scenario for such an
event is as follows.
Suppose a malicious entity, e.g. a compromised SN, able
to initiate a location update request, sends such a request
containing a randomly chosen pseudo-IMSI. If, by chance, the
TID in this pseudo-IMSI happens to match a stored TIDfuture ,
then the HN will incorrectly update its database. If this ‘new’
TID has not been received by the corresponding USIM, then
the current TID in the USIM will equal the value of TIDpast
in the HN database (see steps 1 and 2 in Section 4.3.3).
Unlike the analogous scenario discussed in Section 3.3, this
scenario does not cause pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation in
the scheme described here, since the AuC is still able to map
the IMSI to the TID currently stored in the USIM.
However, even in the scheme described here, the AuC
will lose its mapping from the IMSI to the received pseudo-
IMSI if the malicious entity could successfully cause another
unauthorised TID update in the HN database. If pseudo-
IMSI synchronisation is lost (and cannot be recovered), AKA
will always fail, and the UE will not be able to receive any
network service until the USIM is replaced. The likelihood
of such a pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation is reduced in the
new scheme, in that it requires two false updates to the HN
database; however, such an event is disastrous, and so a way
to recover from this failure state is needed. We describe the
recovery process in Section 5.2 below.
5.2 Synchronisation Recovery Process
In current systems, there are scenarios in which desynchroni-
sation can occur. For example, TMSI-IMSI synchronisation
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can be lost by an SN if it receives repeated MAC-failure mes-
sages as a result of failed authentications. In such a situation,
the SN recovers by requesting the cleartext IMSI, obtaining
a new set of AVs from the HN, running AKA, and allocating
a new TMSI.
Also, as discussed in Section 2.3, if a USIM identifies loss
of SQN synchronisation between it and the HN, it resynchro-
nises SQN by sending a sync-failure token to the HN. On
receiving such a token, the HN adjusts its stored value of
SQN, computes an AV with the new value, and sends the AV
to the SN for use in AKA.
Analogously, in the new scheme described here, if a USIM
detects a possible pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation when au-
thentication fails because of a MAC mismatch, it sends an
AUTM error token to the HN (via the SN). The SN includes
other relevant information, notably the pseudo-IMSI and the
failure cause. As AUTS and AUTM are indistinguishable to
the SN, the SN reports both types of token as a sync-failure.
On receiving the token, the AuC first runs the standard
validation steps for an AUTS . If validation succeeds, the AuC
performs the standard process for SQN-recovery ; otherwise, it
further verifies the token to confirm its validity as an AUTM .
As part of AUTM validation, the AuC proceeds as follows.
(1) It parses the token to retrieve a RID and MAC-M .
(2) It searches its subscriber database for the IMSI for
this RID. If the RID is not found, validation fails;
otherwise, the AuC retrieves the IMSI and the cor-
responding K.
(3) It computes MAC as f1∗(RID, pseudo-IMSI, AMF,
K), and compares it with the retrieved MAC-M. If
they agree, the token is validated; otherwise, valida-
tion fails.
If AUTM validation fails, the AuC reports the issue to the
SN; otherwise, it rectifies the TID entries in its subscriber
database using the procedure described in the following para-
graphs, computes an AV, and sends the AV to the SN for
authentication.
As noted in the previous paragraph, if AUTM validation
succeeds, the SN must adjust its TID values appropriately;
this is achieved as follows. The AuC first retrieves the TID
from the pseudo-IMSI sent with the AUTM token by the SN,
and compares it with the three stored TID values (TIDpast ,
TIDcurrent and TIDfuture) for this IMSI. If it equals any of the
these values then the MAC-failure does not indicate that a
pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation has occurred. Hence, in this
case the AuC does not modify its subscriber database, com-
putes an AV using the procedure described in Section 4.3.2,
and sends the AV to the SN.
Otherwise, the AuC proceeds as follows.
(1) It deletes the values of TIDpast and TIDcurrent for
the IMSI concerned, and adds them to the pool of
unused TIDs.
(2) It checks whether the retrieved TID is in the pool of
unused TIDs. If the TID is available, the AuC sets
TIDcurrent to equal this TID, computes an AV using
the procedure described in Section 4.3.2, and sends
the AV to the SN. Otherwise, the pseudo-IMSI
reported by the USIM must have been allocated
to another subscriber, and the AuC performs the
following steps.
(a) It computes EK1 and selects a TID using steps 2
and 3 of Section 4.3.2.
(b) The AuC sets RAND to equal
((TIDfuture ||INSreset)⊕ EK1 )||randgen(80).
(c) It generates an AV using the computed RAND
in the standard way, and sends the AV to the
SN.
Note that a MAC-failure token reported by a legitimate
subscriber due to loss of synchronisation between its TMSI
and the corresponding pseudo-IMSI will be deemed invalid by
the HN. This is because the MAC component of the token is
computed over the USIM’s actual pseudo-IMSI, whereas the
SN reports a different pseudo-IMSI. To deal with this case,
the SN could either use the HN’s response in processing the
failure token, or simply request the cleartext pseudo-IMSI
before forwarding a failure token.
6 ANALYSIS
6.1 Authentication
The modified AKA protocol described here is as secure as the
existing AKA, since we have not modified it except to replace
the random RAND with a cryptographically constructed
RAND . The constructed RAND is indistinguishable from a
random value if the input key is not known, on the assumption
that data strings masked using the output of the functions
f5∗∗ and f5∗∗∗ are indistinguishable from random data, cf. [3,
4]. The security properties of AKA have been widely analysed,
[1, 34, 46].
Since a USIM accepts the identities sent embedded in
RAND only after AKA has completed successfully, i.e. after
the SN has been authenticated, the modified AKA guarantees
the origin, integrity and timeliness of the new pseudo-IMSI.
Hence, an active adversary cannot force a USIM to change
its pseudo-IMSI to something other than a value selected by
the HN. Moreover, because the SQN value is checked by the
USIM during AKA, an active adversary cannot force a USIM
to accept an ‘old’ pseudo-IMSI, since this checking requires
AVs to be used in strict order of generation.
The scheme does not change the way the data confiden-
tiality and integrity keys are generated.
We formally verified our security claims using ProVerif
(see Section 7 below).
6.2 User Identity Confidentiality
An adversary cannot infer any confidential information from
RAND, since the private values TID, RID, and the instruction
byte embedded in RAND are all masked. An adversary
without access to the key K is unable to learn a pseudo-IMSI
before it is used, ensuring unlinkability between consecutive
pseudo-IMSIs.
The scheme diminishes the impact of IMSI catchers and
improves user identity confidentiality by preventing the IMSI
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ever being sent across the air interface. However, air interface
interactions are not completely anonymous, since the pseudo-
IMSI functions as a pseudonym, potentially enabling the
interactions of a single phone to be tracked for a period; of
course, this is always true if a subscriber resides in a single
location area, even where only a temporary identity, i.e. a
TMSI or GUTI, is used.
Frequent AKA execution could lessen the impact of such
tracking, which would also alleviate the problem of long TMSI
validity periods over multiple geographic areas, as reported
by Arapinis et al. [15]. Although the requirement to execute
AKA frequently is reduced in 4G, the importance of frequent
AKA execution in preventing security attacks is discussed in
recent research [29].
6.3 Pseudo-IMSI Recovery
A request for pseudo-IMSI recovery cannot be forged, since
the request contains a MAC computed over the subscriber’s
RID, pseudo-IMSI, and a value of AMF, using the key K.
The MAC guarantees detection of malicious changes to the
RID or reported pseudo-IMSI, preventing an adversary falsely
initiating a pseudo-IMSI recovery. We formally verify this
claim using ProVerif (see Section 7).
The pseudo-IMSI synchronisation recovery process is sim-
ilar to the existing SQN synchronisation recovery process.
Unlike for SQN, the RID in the pseudo-IMSI recovery re-
quest is transferred in cleartext, since the HN is unable to
identify the subscriber from the reported pseudo-IMSI while
pseudo-IMSIs are desynchronised. This allows possible user
tracking using the RID. As the RID changes over time, the
traceability of the RID is the same as that of the existing
temporary identity.
6.4 Identity Synchronisation
As discussed in Section 6.1, if the cryptographic assumptions
for AKA hold, an adversary cannot force a subscriber to
change its pseudo-IMSI illegitimately. Nevertheless, an ad-
versary can stop or delay the arrival of a RAND containing
a new pseudo-IMSI at a USIM. However, such an event does
not affect pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation, since, as in BVR
and KM, the HN retransmits a pseudo-IMSI until it has
reliable evidence that it has been received by the USIM.
Unlike BVR and KM, an HN updates its subscriber data-
base only when it receives a specific location update request
from an SN, and it keeps the immediate past pseudo-IMSI
for each subscriber. These changes help to minimise the
likelihood of identity desynchronisation, as discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1. Moreover, inclusion of a pseudo-IMSI recovery
process guarantees synchronisation of pseudo-IMSI between
USIM and HN.
Although RIDs and TIDs are managed in the same way,
a RID is only used to recover pseudo-IMSI synchronisation.
The frequency of RID updates is a policy matter for the
network. It might be possible to deploy other methods to
guarantee the synchronisation between RID and IMSI, a
possible avenue for future research.
6.5 Deployment and Interoperability
The scheme modifies only the USIM and the HN, owned
by a single entity, and is transparent to the SN and mobile
phone. This allows phased deployment, e.g. by including the
additional functionality in newly issued USIMs while existing
USIMs continue to function as at present. In addition, the
scheme does not affect existing services dependent on the
IMSI, e.g. lawful interception and billing, making deployment
simpler than for BVR and KM.
There are certain practical issues to be considered. For
example, the set of ‘normal’ IMSIs used by existing USIMs
needs to be kept distinct from the range of pseudo-IMSIs
used by the new USIMs. The HN should use location infor-
mation from both the user’s current and past pseudo-IMSI in
supporting mobile terminated services; that is, the HN might
use the location information of the pseudo-IMSI containing
TIDpast , if delivery of a mobile terminated service using the
pseudo-IMSI containing TIDcurrent fails.
The scheme will not work for GSM, as it depends on the
mutual authentication feature of 3G and 4G AKA. If a UE
using a new-style USIM needs to connect to a GSM network,
it should continue to use the fixed pseudo-IMSI as long as
it is connected to that network. The pseudo-IMSI can be
updated when the UE next roams to a 3G or 4G network.
6.6 Performance and Overhead
The scheme introduces minimal additional overhead to a
USIM. We add two KDFs (to retrieve identities) and one
MAC function (to support identity recovery), all of which
are similar to the existing USIM functions. Transferring a
new pseudo-IMSI to the ME is a new task for a USIM, which
could be performed when the ME is idle. We believe that
this overhead should be manageable, even for a USIM with
limited computational power.
The scheme requires the HN to manage new identities. It
increases database transactions, adds two KDFs for comput-
ing an AV, and introduces new functions, notably the need
to refresh an identity on receiving an appropriate location
update request and identity recovery in the event of pseudo-
IMSI desynchronisation. Since none of these are particularly
complex, it seems likely that this could be achieved with
some combination of allocating more resources, clustering
subscribers in multiple HSSs, and efficient database design.
The scheme does not affect any functionality in the SN or
introduce any additional communications. The only impact
is an increase in the apparent number of subscribers at the
SN, since subscribers switching to a new pseudo-IMSI appear
like new subscribers.
Pseudo-IMSIs and IMSIs for a single HN must all be
distinct. Since multiple pseudo-IMSIs are allocated for each
subscriber, pressure could be created on the number of IMSIs
available to an operator. To address this issue, multiple
MNC codes could be allocated to an operator and three-digit
MNCs could be used to avoid wastage of IMSIs allocated to
small operators.
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6.7 Impact on Other Attacks
Arapinis et al. [16] describe an attack allowing an adversary
to distinguish between UEs based on the error messages
arising from a failed AKA execution. The change to use
of AUTM for reporting MAC-failure messages, which are
thereby indistinguishable from sync-failures, invalidates this
attack.
An attack [42] on the USIM provisioning process com-
promises the key K, compromising all the security features.
However, the scheme described here could reduce the effect of
key compromise, since the initial mapping from pseudo-IMSI
to the key K is lost as soon as the subscriber changes its
pseudo-IMSI, and even an adversary knowing K would not
be able to readily track a device.
7 FORMAL VERIFICATION
We used ProVerif, an automatic cryptographic protocol veri-
fier [19], to analyse the proposed scheme. ProVerif is used
to check the secrecy and authentication properties of cryp-
tographic protocols. It can also be used to verify privacy
properties [20]. The ProVerif checker is not complete, which
means that it may not be capable of proving a property that
holds (it might output invalid attacks). However, it is sound;
that is, if ProVerif verifies that a property is satisfied then
the model ensures the property.
We modelled the modified AKA protocol using the ProVerif
formalism, and verified the security and privacy properties
discussed in Section 6 above2. We checked whether the model
ensures mutual authentication between the USIM and the
SN, and this holds. We also verified the secrecy property
of the transferred identities, i.e. a TID and a RID, and the
model ensures their secrecy when transferred from the HN
to the USIM. We further verified correctness of the pseudo-
IMSI recovery process; to do so we proved that if the HN
initiates a recovery for a USIM, it is indeed requested by
a legitimate subscriber possessing the USIM. Finally, we
followed a similar approach to van den Broek et al. [51] to
successfully verify that the unlinkability property is achieved
by the scheme.
These proofs increase confidence that the proposed scheme
could defend against IMSI catchers while maintaining the
original functionality of the protocol.
8 OTHER RELATED WORK
Apart from the recent work of van den Broek et al. [51]
and Khan and Mitchell [31] (see Section 3), stopping IMSI
catchers has been the subject of research for over 20 years;
we review some of the most relevant.
Samfat and Molva [40] first addressed the underlying pri-
vacy issue, and suggested the use of public key encryption
to hide the permanent identity. Herzberg et al. [30] and
Ateniese et al. [17] discussed anonymity in mobile networks,
and suggested use of a fixed shared secret key to encrypt
permanent identities managed by an HN when sent to the SN.
2The model is available at https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/
files/28145762/ProVerif Model.zip
Mitchell et al. [35] proposed identity and location privacy
mechanisms for 3G systems, using a new temporary user
identity TMUI s for each subscriber. However, analysis of
the usability of the scheme was left as future work.
Choudhury et al. [21] proposed a scheme to improve user
identity confidentiality in the LTE network using a dynamic
mobile subscriber identity (DMSI) instead of the IMSI, anal-
ogous to the scheme described here. However, their scheme
changes the protocol messages and the entities in the mobile
network. Køien [33] proposed a privacy enhanced mutual au-
thentication scheme for LTE using identity-based encryption,
again imposing significant modifications on all the major
system elements.
Sung et al. [45] proposed a scheme to provide identity and
location privacy making use of multiple IMSIs for a single
SIM. However, their scheme involves an additional party in
its operation, needs support by the ME, and requires wireless
data connectivity for sending and receiving calls. The threat
model is also very different, in that the HN is considered as
a potential adversary.
Fouque et al. [26] have recently proposed a scheme address-
ing the IMSI privacy problem. Their scheme introduces a
public key infrastructure for the HN, changes the message
structure and adds new parameters to the AKA.
We use the RAND, sent from HN to UE during AKA, as a
way of conveying information. This idea was apparently first
described in a patent due to Dupre´ [23]. Later, Vodafone [52],
and Khan and Mitchell [32] used a similar concept of a special
RAND. However, these prior uses of the special RAND were
completely different to that proposed here.
9 CONCLUSIONS
We described a novel authentication approach for 3G and
4G mobile systems that does not affect existing SNs and
mobile phones. The IMSI is never sent across a commu-
nication channel; instead a changing pseudo-IMSI is used.
The pseudo-IMSIs appear as new subscribers to the SN, and
are unlinkable. We address the possible loss of pseudo-IMSI
synchronisation between USIM and HN, and present an ap-
proach for pseudo-IMSI recovery to be used if pseudo-IMSI
synchronisation is lost.
The scheme introduces changes to the operation of the
HN and USIM, but not to the SN, the mobile device, or
other internal network protocols, which enables transparent
migration. We discussed the strengths and limitations of the
scheme, and reported the results of a formal analysis. The
scheme alleviates the decades-old privacy problem of IMSI
disclosure on the air interface, and hence ‘trashes the IMSI
catchers in mobile network’.
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